Event Highlight

Former Regional Leaders Evaluate Potential of Gaza Peace Agreement

Posted Oct 22 2025

On October 22, the Institute of Global Politics held a webinar titled "Reimagining Prospects for Peace: A Conversation with Nasser al-Kidwa and Ehud Olmert." The discussion featured Nasser al-Kidwa, former Foreign Minister of the Palestinian Authority, and Ehud Olmert, former Prime Minister of Israel, in conversation about their proposal for a negotiated peace between Israelis and Palestinians. The conversation was moderated by Secretary Jacob Lew, former US Ambassador to Israel, 76th US Secretary of the Treasury, IGP Faculty Policy Director, and Columbia SIPA Professor. Columbia SIPA Dean and IGP Cofounder Keren Yarhi-Milo provided opening remarks.

Transcript

  • **Disclaimer: This transcript was produced using AI transcription technology and has been edited for clarity, but may still contain errors.**

    Keren Yarhi-Milo  01:26

    Good morning, everyone. I'm Karen Yarhi-Milo. I'm the Dean of SIPA, the Adley e Stevenson Professor of International Relations, and co founders of SIPA Institute of global politics. I am delighted to welcome you today to today's timely and important conversation. As the dean of SIPA, it is my privilege to convene discussions that bring together world leaders, scholars, practitioners, to wrestle with some of the most urgent and complex issues shaping our world, and few challenges loom larger, or even have proven more intractable than the conflict between Israel and Hamas. Yes, yet, it is precisely because of the difficulty and sensitivity of this issue that we must continue to engage imagine alternative visions and explore pathways towards peace, especially the broader possibility of a viable two state solution, which is the topic of the discussion today as well. Today's discussion, as you know, comes at a critical and historic moment. We are just days into Phase One of the Washington brokered peace agreement, which includes hostage and prisoners exchanges, humanitarian corridors into Gaza and partial military withdrawals, the plan represent the most comprehensive us back framework in years, one that even critiques acknowledge owes much up To the diplomatic initiative led by former led by President Donald Trump, whose negotiations helped lay the groundwork for this fragile but genuine opening. At the same time, the ceasefire remains under strain. Sporadic violence has flared already, and both sides have accused one another in violation. So yes, implementation is uneven, but the fact that dialog continues and the ceasefire still holds is a good sign. So it is against this backdrop of Hope tempered by realism, that today's dialog takes on particular urgency. We are really honored to have to welcome two distinguished statesmen who have spent their entire careers wrestling grappling with this issue, Mr. Nasser Al qudwa and Mr. Ed Olmert. Mr. Al KWA has long been a central figure in Palestinian diplomacy, serving as the Palestinian permanent observer to the United Nations and later as a Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Olmert career spends more than four decades, including his tenure as Israel's 12th Prime Minister, during which he advanced one of the most detailed Israeli proposal for a two state solution. Together, Mr. Olmert and al Qaeda have argued that the ceasefire must be more than a pause. It must be the beginning of a credible political process that restores agencies to both people and reimagines coexistence on the basis of mutual sovereignty, that shared vision is precisely what brings us together today, guiding our conversation is my colleague, Jake Jacob blue, former US ambassador to Israel under the Biden administration 76 US Secretary of the Treasury and now Professor of International Public Affairs here at SIPA. He's also the Policy Director The. The Institute of global politics, and his deep experience in diplomacy and policy make making will help frame today discussion in terms of both political feasibility and moral responsibility. I want to thank my colleagues at the Institute of global politics for organizing this timely event for all of you for joining us, what for what I know will be a thoughtful, substantive, and I hope, constructive exchange. And with that, it is my great pleasure to turn it over to Secretary Liu, thank you.

    Jacob Lew  05:38

    Thank you very much, Karen and thank you, Prime Minister Elmer and Foreign Minister al kidwa for being with us this morning. I've had the privilege and the pleasure to talk with both of you about these issues, and very much look forward to going into some of the thinking behind the work you've done together to try to promote a plan for the future, given the enormity of the moment and what's going on, I would be remiss not to begin with getting your assessment as we start out where we are right now, as Karen said in her introductory remarks, this is a fragile moment. What is your assessment of whether the cease fire is holding, can hold, and whether this is a moment that actually permits the process to continue to proceed on to the longer term, kind of issues that you've worked on together. Why don't we begin Ehud with with with you, and then Nasser, please jump in right after.

    Ehud Olmert  06:45

    Thank you, Secretary. I'm honored and delighted to be your guest and the guest of the university and Professor Milo and of course, with my partner from the Palestinian side, Dr Nasser kudwa, I think that we have today something which is, for many of us, or all of us living in the Middle East, of course, is a very positive development, which is A ceasefire, what is called and titled as peace 2025 which was the title of the event hosted by President Assisi in Sharm El Sheik week ago, with President Trump and so many leaders from every corner of the world, was called 20 peace 2025 but the truth is that what we have now is a comprehensive agreement to end the war in Gaza. This is the title of the agreement that was signed. Now it is very important because we were we were fighting for, we were campaigning for. We were criticizing the Israeli government for attempting to expand the war, which we thought had to end long ago. So the fact that finally President Trump forced the Israeli side, and probably manipulated successfully the other side, the brokers and the Qataris and the Egyptians and the Turks, and through them, also Hamas, to agree to end the war is very important. And of course, the return of all the hostages, live hostages, living hostages, and the hopeful return of all the bodies of the others, is very important, but that's what we have now. We have a fragile cease fire there can be broken and violated every moment. In fact, it is not the what we know to be cease fire, a real cease fire, because there are all the times, there are all kinds of slight confrontations here, a few Palestinians were killed here, the couple of Israeli soldiers were killed. So it's not even yet complete at that stage, but hopefully it will be preserved in the presence of Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner in the Middle East, and perhaps the visit of Vice President Vance will support the the ceasefire, but this is what we have as for a much broader process remains to be seen. We have presented Dr Hill, by myself, represented a basis for an understanding about a comprehensive peace on the basis of two states in 67 borders and so on and so forth, which we may refer to later. But this is not something of what was accepted by the two sides, and let's hopefully pass this first stage that the peace. The cease fire is protected in a careful manner, and then see how we can move, particularly what President Trump has in mind about the next step.

    Jacob Lew  10:12

    Thank you, Doctor.

    Nasser al-Kidwa  10:14

    Yes, I too would like to express our appreciation, my appreciation and my thanks for the invitation and for the organization and for the attendees to be here that I think could be very useful and productive meeting. So thank you again. But with regard to your question, of course, what we have now is yes, fragile ceasefire that is holding, largely, with some exceptions, of course, especially what happened two days ago in Rafah, when there was some Israeli raids against some Hamas positions and things like that that threatened the integrity of the ceasefire. But then I think that that has passed, and now we are back to the continuation of the ceasefire and to follow up. I think I can say that two things should happen. One, we should not allow anybody to break this deal. And two, I think we need to proceed, because if we don't proceed, it's going to get broken. So we have to proceed. And in this regard, we have too many difficult issues. For instance, the position of visa vie Hamas. I mean, that has to be clearer. And frankly, we need to stop double token, things like that, and and say things as they are. What do we want to achieve in this, in this regard? And then, of course, the issue of governance of Gaza, you know, the deal or the initiative of the President, proposes peace. Peace bureau or peace council that is supervisor, in my opinion, and a buddy that would discuss politics and general policies and things like that, which is okay, but then it does also propose Board of Directors headed by Mr. Tony Blair that actually governs Gaza Strip. And I have to be careful here and say this is not personal, but no foreigner could be brought to Gaza Strip to govern gas or any other part of the Palestinian territory, that's this is not possible, and we cannot afford something, something like that. So we need to continue negotiations. We need to need we need to continue talking to each other collectively, so that we can have a vision about what should should happen. But definitely, we have to have to have a Palestinian body that is organically linked to the Palestinian Authority. And yes, we can have some observatory or some supervisory body in the form of Board of peace that was proposed by President Trump. And then, of course, there is the issue of security in the form of now, everybody is talking about international force that that is authorized by the Security Council, which is fine. That does not make the forums, by the way, peacekeeping operation, but nevertheless, it gives it some authority. It covers it gives it cover, political cover that would allow it to function in the region. But at the same time, I think I need to stress the fact that there is a need also for a Palestinian security force in the amount of 10 15,000 man that will do the actual job and will cooperate and coordinate with the international force. They saw that there are some difficult issues ahead, waiting for for us, in addition, of course, to the issue of complete Israeli withdrawal from Gaza Strip without return. And this is very important, not only because of political reasons, but because of practical reasons if we want to reconstruct Gaza. And then there is the issue of the overall political solution in the form of two state solution that we proposed as the hold on said earlier, something like 14 months ago, or something like that.

    Jacob Lew  14:33

    Thank you. So as a way, perhaps of transitioning to talking about the proposal that the two of you have worked on. Do you see points of overlap between the 20 points that were agreed to by all the parties just last week? In particular, in terms of security in Gaza, your proposal calls for a temporary Arab security presence. That's not a. Exactly the same as the joint international force that's in the 20 points. But it would be, I think, helpful to in turning to your proposal, perhaps use what is in the 20 points that may be a bridge to what you have in mind. And Dr okibre, why don't we begin with you.

    Nasser al-Kidwa  15:21

    Yeah, okay. Listen, there are, of course, some similarities, and there are some meeting points, if you wish, you referred to one in the form of security, because we propose, we understood the need for an additional security presence, and we proposed, and yes, you are, right, a temporary Arab presence, which was not very popular, because many people preferred international force. But frankly, it's not exactly an international force. It's somewhere in between. It's an Arab presence and international force. The important thing is to provide for additional security measures that would then allow the court, court cooperation and coordination between this force and the Palestinian, Palestinian security force. There are other points as well. For instance, the key, in my opinion, the key to the issue of governance is what we propose in we said that we need to establish a new Palestinian body that is organically linked, organically linked to the Palestinian Authority. At the end of the day, this is what we are going to have. How exactly, I'm not sure, but definitely I think this will be the parameters, or the framework of what we are going to happen. More importantly, what we propose in the in terms of the overall political solution is what's going to happen. We said that we need an overall political solution in the form of two states, Israel and Palestine, on the basis 1967 borders with some kind of swap, 4.4% that was almost proposal, and so on so forth. So yes, there are similarity with regard to what we did propose in terms of ending the war in Gaza, and also with regard to the overall political solution, and I believe at the end will come also the status of Jerusalem. And I think what you what we propose, will be some kind of source for, you know, optimism and source of finding the proper, appropriate solution.

    Ehud Olmert  17:38

    Prime Minister, yeah, thank you.

    Ehud Olmert  17:43

    I want to say something presumptuous, arrogant, typically, Israeli, don't worry one day, one day when a peace treaty will be signed between Israel and Palestine. I hope it will happen soon, but it may take some time. One day, the peace treaty that will be signed will be identical to what Dr Kidwell and myself proposed in our very short page and a half, which, I guess, a copy of which you also have at a time that you were still ambassador. Yes, right? This will be, there can be no other. There can be no other. At the end of the day, there will be a Palestinian state, alongside the State of Israel. The Palestinian state will have a territory which is based on the 67 borders. And that will have, will have, you know, a certain territory annexed. We talked about 4.4% I don't want to go into all the details, but this is it. This will be and unfortunately for some, but inevitably in terms of the substance, the Old City of Jerusalem will not be under any explicit political sovereignty of either Israel or Palestine. It will be administered by a trust of few nations, Arab nations, Israel, America, so that it will provide the the all the believers that want to come to the holy places, Jews, Christians, Muslims, the access to do it and so on. This, this, in essence, this will be the agreement. Now, this is what we proposed, and we linked it in our statement, signed statement to also ending of the war in Gaza. Because without ending the war in Gaza, without settling that aspect of a much broader problem. There is not any beginning that we can move forward, forward with. However, while we talk specifically about all these basic parameters, essential parameters that are in the core of the conflict. The 20 points of President Trump, do not mention anything. The only thing that there is there is that there is a some hint in a very soft language it talks about that it will leave the Palestinians a certain space for trying to achieve goals, Palestinian goals, more or less, that's what it says. But he doesn't talk about two states. It doesn't talk about all the other aspects that we have mentioned. So what is important in in the in the Trump 20 points, I think what is very important, maybe even revolutionary. It has proved what we knew, or I knew, what you Jack knew, what nasal kiban knew, knew all along that there is only one person in the whole world which has the power of taking the two sides here, shaking them and forcing them to embark on something more meaningful. There is no one else all of the European leaders is important as they are, and I respect them, and I don't think that they're enemies of Israel, or that they are sold out to one side or to the other, that's all nonsense. They are good, decent guys that are anxious to move forward somewhere positive, Macron and sterner and and Chancellor Martin in the Prime Minister Carly from Canada and so on and so forth. They have no power to force their will on any of the sides. The only guy that has it for a short period of time, I don't know how long. I don't know how long, because of American problems and American domestic issues that I'm not familiar with, perhaps completely, but he has it now, and he forced Netanyahu to accept the ceasefire after he forced him to apologize to the Qataris in the most strange manner, to put it mildly, okay, having a Qatari guy sitting next to Netanyahu, and Netanyahu reads out a text that was dictated to him by the Qataris to apologize for what the Israeli attack there? This is not something that anyone before him, before Trump, could do before because of many reasons. Doesn't matter, and I have enormous respect, I say, even personal love to President Biden, but he was not in a position to do what Trump does. So the question now, the most important thing is, is Trump? Does he know what he wants? Does he have a broad understanding of all the complexities and the sensitivities? Does he have the right people with him? He has with coffee has Jared Kushner, but I'm talking about more experts knowledgeable of the backgrounds and the sensitivities and the complexities and the possible ramifications and so on and so forth. And he is, is he ready to come to the Israeli prime minister and to tell him, Netanyahu, the game is over. We are moving forward now into a comprehensive solution. If you want to do it, fine if you don't want to do it. You know, I'm sick and tired of wasting my time on these problems. I think he has to do it. He can do it. Question is, does he know what he wants? Does he have the necessary advice that can help him with and is he prepared to carry on forcefully in order to achieve it?

    Jacob Lew  23:49

    So picking up on that, I know that the plan that you envision is not based on a solution to Gaza, but the immediate challenge is how to stabilize Gaza, how to have some minimal level of security in Gaza, how to have an ability for Gaza to be governed? Is there an opportunity in Gaza to demonstrate some of the principles that would be necessary for there to be fuller embrace of the longer term plans that you've together agreed are the goal, and in particular,

    Ehud Olmert  24:27

    Jack before, before NASA answers this, which he needs to answer. Obviously, I just want to say one thing, a prerequisite for any movement, a more and more stable and more far reaching solution of Gaza is the realization in Israel that Gaza is Palestine, that Gaza is not part of Israel, and is not going to be part of Israel. It has to be governed by Gaza, by by Palestinians and and that they have to be an essential. Part of every movement going forward

    Jacob Lew  25:02

    so but that's actually the point. I exactly that I was driving it right now in Gaza. I don't know that there is a Palestinian entity that could step in and immediately take over. My assessment was, when I was there, less than a year ago, that it would take a lot more than any one entity could do. And a lot of the issues in the 20 points, the principles in the 20 points, were things that we were working on a year ago and 18 months ago, the notion that you have the Arab countries, the Gulf, the United States, Europe altogether, saying something has to move forward in Gaza, is there something as a transitional form of governance that provides an opportunity for there to be some confidence building where Palestinian Authority related personnel who are the only people On the ground to do many of the tasks that have to be done, whether it's restoring the water, the power or policing the streets, have to be engaged. And Dr okib, I heard you say it couldn't be an international force, but in the context of a transition in Gaza, is there some opportunity, if not necessity, to do something that's not a final resolution, but a bridge that perhaps could allow for the kinds of confidence that are needed to go forward, to start to build up.

    Nasser al-Kidwa  26:35

    Well, listen, Gaza is very important situation, and yes, we need to solve the problem in Gaza, and we need to find overall political arrangements for Gaza. But definitely, it's not the end of the story. It's only Gaza, and we need to have an overall political solution, as I said earlier, and Rod Olmert also said that, and that is in the form of two states, Israel and Palestine, based on 1967 border, etc. Now, is this easy to do? No, it's not easy to do you refer to the fact that there is no ready entity to do that, because Gaza was under the governance of Hamas, under the control of Hamas for so many years, and because of the fact that the Palestinian Authority, as is, is not acceptable for the Israelis, for the Americans, probably for some Arabs, and maybe for some Gazans as well. So what's the solution here? The solution here is to find some kind of a new entity that is organically linked, as I said earlier, to the Palestinian Authority. Now, this, this, of course, is not easy to do, but I think if we find the right structure, we can do it. And the right structure is simply we need to have governance by Palestinians in the form of this political, new political entity or new governing entity, plus the supervisory board as as proposed, the board of peace, for instance. But we can't afford having other plans and other structures and other things now. I know that we have so many plans now, and frankly, there are good plans in theory, but I don't think that they can be implemented as such. What we need first is to arrange for the appropriate structures. We need to reach some appropriate understanding, and then we can have the group of people, competent people, that can run Gaza and can do the necessary project, and netherly Six, subject, of course, to the supervision that I spoke about. But let's not mix up things and add board of directors, and I don't know what, and some experts, some foreigners, some I don't know what, and you know, plans and projects and, you know, you name it. I mean, everybody want a piece of from, from this cake, and I think there is no cake at the end of the day. It's very difficult situation. I mean, it's, it's, it's terrible situation. We need to reconstruct Gaza from scratch, and that is very difficult and costly at the same time. So maybe we need to direct our efforts towards finding the money, finding the financing, and finding the appropriate people that can do that can do the job. Unfortunately, there is no enough dialog among the parties until now. So there is no agreement on these simple things. What kind of Palestinian entity we want to have.

    Jacob Lew  29:44

    But if I can push you a little bit on that, you know, I, as Treasury Secretary, I had a lot of experience working with the IMF going into countries that needed support in the situation where. Now in Gaza, there's some similarities, because someone is going to have to write a check, and whether it's Gulf countries or international bodies, they're going to want to have some confidence that the money will go to what it's intended for and be sustainable. That often leads to a shared governance arrangement for a transitional period, which is very hard. I mean, even in the context of the IMF with a standing government, it's been known to undermine governments in their own countries, and one of the challenges was always, how do you not have that be the end result? But it is something that permits for a transition.

    Nasser al-Kidwa  30:40

    The first part is fine. Nobody is against any kind of supervision that would alleviate any fears on the part of donors with regard to their money, and the money should go in the right direction. That's fine. But shared governance, I don't know what does this mean. I know, Mr. Secretary, that you know those, those guys who dealt with money are too smart, and, of course, they come with ideas that many times they look bizarre. What does it mean? Shared, shared governance, Palestinians and non Palestinians sitting together, who will, who will actually have, they say, the decision, the decision probably the foreigner, which takes us to the same starting point that that foreigner does not know the situation in Gaza, especially destroyed Gaza, you have a situation that is unprecedented, and you need to have people who knows the place, and more importantly, they enjoy the trust of the population. They are known by the population, and they enjoy the trust and they can do the job. They are competent enough to do the job. Now. Again, supervision, yes, okay, any kind of supervision is something that I personally have no problem with. But actual governments? No, because any Palestinian territory can be governed only by Palestinians, irrespective of anything, and irrespective of the term, including shared governments. Mr.

    Ehud Olmert  32:15

    Secretary, yes, I will try perhaps wrap it up in a somewhat softer manner in order to see if we can present it in a most more acceptable way. I think that the chief executive of Gaza has to be Palestinian, independent executive authority, all right, and he has to be appointed with an agreement approval of the Palestinian Authority, because Palestinian Authority is the only framework, Palestinian framework which is recognized by all the agreements signed between Palestine and Israel and also by all the international organizations. So this has to be approved by them, but the chief executive has to have independent executive authorities to be able to run it outside of the complexities and the sensitivities and the corruption which characterize the Palestinian Authority In the West Bank. Okay, this is one thing. What the operation in Gaza will need in order to bring back Gaza into life, to build Gaza, it will need a certain coordination with the international community, with international organizations, with international institutions, with countries that are prepared, in principle, to even write the checks for for, you know, talking about 10s of billions of dollars to rebuild Gaza. And I do think that Tony Blair can be a good guy for that. I know Tony. I know that he was always interested in the Middle East, and he was involved, and he was the emissary of the quarter after he retired from Prime Minister. I think he can contribute, not in as a chief executive. Chief executive has to be Palestinian, because Gaza is part of Palestine. It has to be reinstated from day one. Okay? So that international community will be aware of that, and also that some of the Messianic, crazy, fundamentalist radicals, killers, terrorists that are now members of the Israeli government will understand that there is no game here for them to be part of, but supervising, coordinating international body is something that can be very helpful, and I don't I'm not familiar. Perhaps there may be some others, but I'm not familiar with international figures. I. Other than Tony Blair, which can potentially do this job better than him. And therefore I think that that in that context, it should be and also I want to say one thing about the security force. I'm a I'm a supporter of international security force. I'm in favor of of course, the the security force has to be based on a soldiers coming from moderate Arab countries, including Palestinians, by the way. Palestinians, of course, and Jordanians and Egyptians, hopefully Emiratis and if the Saudis will be part of it, great. I think that it can be very useful and very helpful and very positive if there will be some European representatives. We need the international we need the international community to be part of the rebuilding process in a very sensitive and accurate definition of the roles and the positions. But like the Americans now, send 200 American soldiers to supervise the implementation of a cease fire, and they are now in Israel, and they are supervising it, not depending on their reports that they necessarily get from the Israeli intelligence, but in their own eyes, they check and they observe and they supervise everything in order to help. I don't think that it will be such a bad idea if there will be a British soldiers, and I understand that Prime Minister Starmer is in favor of it, and perhaps French soldiers and German soldiers and Dutch soldiers and some more that will be complementing, in coordination with the armed soldiers that will be part of the security force that will need to make sure that no terrorist forces are trying to re emerge again in Gaza, because That's what we want to block as a preliminary stage in order to change everything in Gaza. So, you know, I think in this perhaps somewhat softer wrapping, maybe the magic. This

    Nasser al-Kidwa  37:12

    is the magic of olm, you know, I need to say that I, for one, do not have a problem with neither supervisory boards nor coordinating boards, as long as we have the actual implemented, actual governments being done by Palestinians. Because it should be genuine Palestinians. And by the way, if we don't do that, if you do something else, the population Gaza is hungry and is sick and is in terrible situation. And for these threes, and they will go along with whatever arrangements the National Committee does, but only for a short while,

    Jacob Lew  37:53

    just on a little note of optimism when the last cease fire was implemented and the Rafa bordic Crossing was opened. It was opened in a manner that's not inconsistent with what you've described. You know, there were Palestinian security forces, there were European observers, there was international monitoring. And the challenge will come in some ways, on the symbols as much as the realities. I remember endless discussions of whether there could be flags or arm patches on the security forces. In the end, there need to be people on the ground who are maintaining security, and that will include Palestinians and hopefully others. My concern is how many people you need to stabilize all of the Gaza Strip. You have to start somewhere, though, and there was an initial beginning in the last cease fire in Rafa that could be built on. Going forward, if I can turn the focus to your plan,

    Nasser al-Kidwa  38:56

    may I just say something here? Because what is important in my in my mind, maybe even more than this, is to ensure that there will be Israeli withdrawal without return,

    Jacob Lew  39:09

    without one I couldn't hear you

    Nasser al-Kidwa  39:10

    without return, because returning Israeli forces would mean controlling The borders. And controlling the borders would mean deciding whether iron can get in or not, wood can get in or not, and so on and so forth. You cannot reconstruct Gaza this way. So we need to change the relationship to an Israel and Gaza Strip as prelude to changing the relationship between Israel and the West Bank. And of course, that was going to be some kind of an experience that would, of course, show the way forward with regard to the overall political

    Ehud Olmert  39:51

    solution. Dr al Kilwa, if I may say, there will always be an Israeli military presence. Is outside on the Israeli side of the border between us and Gaza, or between us and the Palestinian side. That's obvious. And then if you're talking about a presence in the border between Gaza and Egypt, for instance, like in Rafa, in the Philadelphia line and so on and so forth, that's precisely why we want to have an international security force that will be brought in order to supervise and to control any possible changes that might assist, you know, terrorist groups from rising again into a position in Gaza, I think that this is something that has there been a much better, softer, greater trust between Israeli and Palestinians, and there is some, but not enough, in my mind, not with Gaza, but in the West Bank, and with The authority, all these technical issues could have been resolved easily. Question is, and this is my question, I guess it's used just as well. What is the concept? What is the idea, if he has one of the American administration about the next phase, not in general terms, not in broad terms, which are not specific and not explicit. What you guys want to happen? Do you want to start the process of negotiations towards a two state solution or not? If you are not, then I'm afraid that this is a waste of a good opportunity, so you have to make it be seen and felt rapidly.

    Jacob Lew  41:50

    I can't speak obviously for the current administration, but I can say that for the 14 months that I was there, the message that we were delivering was there has to be a process that can lead and will lead to the discussion of a two state solution. There was always some tension about what irreversible meant, because it had to be with the consent of both parties, and that meant Israel had to agree. But the reason we took that view, I think, hasn't changed. And I think the President, President Trump, has echoed this, and Jared Kushner and Steve woodcoff have echoed this. For the Regional Outlook to be where Israel wants it, where we want it, where I think the other countries in the region want it, that discussion has to take place. We presented it as the thing that had to be on the table for Saudi normalization to happen, that when I was there at the height of the war, was not enough to get the conversation going. The question is, now that we're at a cease fire, we have an agreement to proceed to a phase two discussion. Can you get there? And if I can ask you, maybe turn the table. Is the environment in Israel now such that the conversation can be had when I was there, it was very difficult even to have the conversation, for understandable reasons. October 7 was an ongoing trauma, but with the Return of the Living hostages and a cease fire, and hopefully the return of the remains of the of the hostages who were killed, is there a place in Israel now to have this conversation? Because the future in terms of all of the benefits of regional cooperation, in some way are going to hit either a stopping point or start to slip away. If that conversation can't happen,

    Nasser al-Kidwa  43:50

    can I make it before? Before he would listen? I want Israeli engagement. We need that, and it's necessary to reach some kind of an overall, final solution that's working. I have no problem with that, but to say that we need a process that lead to the discussion, to a discussion on a Palestinian state, that means giving the Israeli side almost a veto, a veto power, which is not going to solve anything. We need to make it clear that we are going in that direction, but in that path, we need the Israeli engagement, and we need to have a discussion. So either choose Mr. Secretary, either process or a discussion process leading to two state solution, or a discussion that leads to the two state solution, but not a process leading to a discussion on the two states.

    Jacob Lew  44:43

    So I was answering a list question about the current administration, which I said, I can't speak for them. We had a clear position. It had to be a process and leading to the two state solution. Yes, that was the Biden administration. I. I The issue that I raised was very much the reality on the ground in Israel. When I was there, you

    Ehud Olmert  45:06

    may contribute something to your

    Nasser al-Kidwa  45:09

    soft and abroad, you would come on your discussion.

    Ehud Olmert  45:13

    You know, it reminds me at the very beginning, at the very beginning of the of the negotiations I held with President Abbas going back to 2000 end of 2006 beginning of 2007 what eventually was known to be the Annapolis process, but actually it started long before Annapolis, at the very early stage, President Abbas say that he appoints Abu Allah to be the chairman of the Palestinian negotiating group. And I say to the president, President, why did you do that? You know, I'm not certain that this is a good thing. He said, No, you don't know. Abu Allah loves this peace process very much. And I say to him, that's what scares me. He loves the process. He loves the process. And I want to take decisions and to move forward, and he lies in love in the process. I don't want the process to take too much time. So in a way, you know, answering you or NASA's questions and your comment, look, presently, Israel is not prepared for anything that, partly as a result of the terrible trauma that we have been through after the seventh of October. And I'm sure that you secretaries, you are familiar with what happened then, because you were at that time in Israel, and you remember the reactions and the emotions and the traumas. But one thing the American president then advised us, which was thoughtful and deep, and we didn't listen to him, because we didn't listen to anyone. Biden, when he came to Israel, he reminded us of what happened in America in September 11, 2001 and then he said, My advice to you is don't be consumed completely by the rage and the emotions which are now over, over well, all of you think, and because you may make mistakes that we did, and therefore I think that it is incumbent upon us to be able to overcome the natural desire of You, know, expressing our rage and the desire to avenge and what not, and to come to some realistic terms about what is good for our future. And therefore we should engage in a process. Obviously, are we now prepared for it? Is the Israeli politics ready for it? Unfortunately, no. And this is why, one of the reasons why, on the one hand, I campaign with Doctor Al kidwa everywhere we can go, in America, in Europe, everywhere, and talk about the need for a process. And on the other hand, I'm doing everything I can together with many others to try and replace the Israeli government with a more solid, reasonable normative leadership there will be also ready to consider the process of a two state solution.

    Jacob Lew  48:33

    So we focused on politics in Israel. We focused on the importance of the role of the United States. What about the Arab countries and their influence over Hamas and in in the region? Do you see them remaining deeply engaged, applying the kind of pressure on Hamas that will be needed even to accomplish phase one of the agreement, because the confidence building will not really begin unless we can see that phase one is working, and that means The Return of the remains of the remaining deceased hostages. It means having a process for some kind of disarmament of Hamas. You know, I myself think that one has to be realistic. It won't be the last firearm in Hamas, but Hamas as a serious military threat. Do you see countries like Qatar and Turkey staying engaged, keeping the pressure on and Nasser, why don't we begin with you?

    Nasser al-Kidwa  49:50

    Okay, let me say, What do I think with regard to position vis a vis Hamas? Hamas says now that we are not going to participate in governing also, I. I don't think this is good enough. We need more than that. We need Hamas to understand that this is the new chapter, and we need to accept, commit to ending its control over Gaza in all its forms. That means political, administrative, as well as security, and security leads to putting the heavy arms under the control of the official, the official body in return, to be also frank with you, in return, I think that the door should be open for Hamas to have some structural transformation into a political party that does participate in the Palestinian political life under the Palestinian law, which should stipulate some regulation, some rules in this in this regard, some conditions if you, if you wish, in this regard, now to answer your question with regard to the Arab states, first of all, I have to say that Arab states do not have common positions, either on this one nor on other things. And you have here, of course, when it comes to Hamas, the position of the Emirates Saudi Arabia is one thing, and the position of Qatar and Turkey, and probably to a lesser extent, much lesser extent, Egypt, is another thing. So what we need is to have a dialog that, first, you know, unify, unify the the Arab position, and maybe also the Turkish position as well, which I don't think is impossible to achieve, but we need a dialog. We need some discussion, some genuine discussion. In the past, discussion was easy because of the presence of the Palestinian maestro, who is, you know, who normally is liked by his peers, and, you know, has confidence by his of his peers and things like that. And that Maestro would would bring the parties together and would push for a joint position that Maestro does not exist anymore, unfortunately, and that's why it's more difficult. But nevertheless, we ought to do it. We ought to have some dialog among Arabs leading to this kind of situation. Now finally, that means, I think that I do believe that Qatar and Turkey will not obstruct any kind of reasonable understanding reach in this regard. I think they are maneuvering now because of what some Israelis say, that Hamas has to disarm and leave, which is unrealistic. Of course, they are not going to to disappear. And if we change the dialog, if we change the discourse, we would be able, I think, to reach some kind of reasonable understanding along the line that I tried to explain.

    Jacob Lew  52:55

    But if you look at the situation today, Hamas has not disarmed. They've been executing opposition within the Palestinian community, amongst the opposition parties in Gaza, and it's not an unreasonable fear that they they'll remain a threat, especially when they've fired projectiles into into Israel into into the buffer zone and killed Israeli soldiers. So if there's not going to be the possibility of zero presence of Hamas, and from day one, the American position was, stop saying, eliminate Hamas. It's impossible. You won't eliminate it. You have to reduce it so that it's no longer a threat. I guess my question, and I'll go to you on this Ehud, from the perspective of the Israeli public, with the government still using maximalist language in terms of disarmament and exile, what is the kind of point at which the message in Israel will be, it's now safe. It's Israel's security is not threatened. And will that be enough to maintain security at a minimal level within Gaza?

    Ehud Olmert  54:20

    Well, obviously, you know, Hamas today is not the same threat that it was two years ago. Okay, I think it's obvious. And God forbid, had it not been so, someone would have asked, what is the efficiency of the most powerful Israeli army after fighting two years that if Hamas is more or less where it was, Hamas is not, is not the threat for this existence of Israel. It's nonsense. It's not a threat in that level. But Hama, not Hamas, which is still there with weapons and with some. Flexibility and freedom to make itself, you know, felt, can create loss a lot of small events that can erupt into big events, and therefore it has to be more tightly supervised and held I'm not certain that Turkey and Qatar are the best vehicles for this, and therefore I think that the international security force, including the Palestinians and armed soldiers and perhaps some Europeans, will be much more effective In providing this now, okay, don't call it complete disarm. Don't call it elimination of every one of the Hamas, but taking it two or three steps further in the reduction of any option that Hamas may have in order to somehow steer the stability that we want to build in in vis a vis Gaza, and I think that that kind of operation, not the dependence on Turkey and Qatar, will speak to the Israeli public opinion better, because it Will quieten down and will make Israelis feel that perhaps the the enormous efforts and sacrifice of the Israeli fighting over the last two years, and in addition these measures, is something that can guarantee the beginning of safer, not absolute safety, but much safer way of living in The now spot in the south part of the State of Israel. And I guess this is something that realistically we can speak about when we talk about security.

    Jacob Lew  56:51

    So we have about five minutes left, and we've just had a pretty far ranging conversation about the current situation, the moment of possibility and the risks. Maybe we can end by each of you spending a couple of minutes reflecting on whether at this moment, with a cease fire, with the engagement of the United States and the various other countries in the region and around the world, whether we are closer to or farther away from a two state solution, and what would have to happen in the next weeks and months for this moment not to be lost.

    Nasser al-Kidwa  57:43

    Okay, listen, I think it's very important that we have gotten the engagement of the President of the United States. In the last period of time, there was an engagement, and there was a determination to implement the plan or the vision or whatever you want to call it. Now, it's very important to keep the engagement and the determination, because if this changes, God forbid, we will be going in the opposite direction. So it is important, and I think if we maintain this kind of engagement and determination, I think that will get us closer to the two state solution.

    Jacob Lew  58:28

    That's an optimistic closing note. David

    Ehud Olmert  58:32

    had someone told you that in the middle of the war between Israel and Palestine and Gaza and all that came with it, all the the emotions and the traumas and the and the destruction and the killing the two prominent, one Israeli, former prime minister, one former foreign minister of the Palestinian Authority, and for that matter, also not unimportant, the nephew of Arafat will issue a joint statement signed in agreement of what should be the end of the war, and also the end of the conflict, the historic conflict between England and the Palestinians. You may have said, I mean, come Don't be a dreamer. Now I'll tell you something. We are dreamers. Okay? Doctor and myself are dreamers, but we are not naive. We are veterans of everything that politics can teach you. We have been everywhere. Okay, we have been in every position. We were never in every conflict. We were in every controversy. We were we were in every position where you have to take decisions, and sometimes it's strong decisions in order to move forward and tell you something, it all depends on leadership, on the leadership on the Palestinian side, which is lacking now Israelis, leadership, which is, I don't have to tell you, and I have to tell the people that are watching us what I think about. Allow them, I think that they have to be removed any minute, and also on the leadership of the international community, particularly of the United States of America. If the United States of America will not hesitate to do that, which may not seem to be popular in certain sections of political basis here and there, but will move forward with a long range understanding about the strategic needs of the region. Then it will end up with a peace agreement between us and the Palestinians on a two state basis, and a comprehensive regional normalization that will include the Saudis and the others and other Muslim countries. This is the strategy, this is the aim. This is what we have to fight for. And I believe that this is possible. If we will not believe, we will not work, if we will not work, we will not do. If we will not do, we will complain. I want to do

    Jacob Lew  1:00:59

    well on that note, leadership is about proving that hope is not naivete, but it means rolling up your sleeves and doing hard things and demonstrating that the impossible is possible. So I hope that this conversation helps others to think about what they can do to move this conversation, this process forward so that real progress can be made from this moment that we're in. Thank you both so much for joining us great conversation. Look forward to staying engaged on these issues with both of you.

    Ehud Olmert  1:01:39

    Thank you, Secretary. Very much.