

## Tagging FIMI Cases in Elections Using DISARM Framework

### - Codebook

This manual provides the coding scheme used by the author to tag the entire database with the DISARM tagging system. It instructs how to tag elections cases and provides examples to ensure the correct selection of the TTPs to support the future expansion of this open-source database by all the community.

*Disclaimer:* This codebook is a first known attempt at standardizing the tagging system using the DISARM framework with such a large amount of data. It is based on previous practices observed at VIGINUM and the European External Action Service (EEAS). It may be adjusted in the future depending on future feedback and future updates of the DISARM framework.

**Year:** indicates the election year.

**Target Country:** indicates the country targeted by the FIMI campaign.

**Event:** indicates the category of election (e.g. Presidential Election, Legislative Election, Municipal Election, General Election, Federal Election).

**Region:** indicates the region where the target country is located (e.g. Europe, Americas, Africa)

**Sub-region:** indicates the subregion where the target country is located.

**Country of Origin:** indicates the country of origin of the campaign.

**Threat Actor:** indicates the threat actor.

If the attribution is not certain, a \* is written after the threat actor's name.

If the threat actor is not known, the term "unknown" is written.

**Source of Attribution:** indicates the actor(s) who have attributed the campaign to the threat actor or country of origin.

**Event description:** summarizes the campaign.

**T0002\_Facilitate State Propaganda:** the campaign's narratives convey pro-state messaging.

**T0072\_Segment Audiences:** the campaign targets different audiences. This TTP can be used when there is no clear (geographic, demographic, political) criteria identified.

**T0072.001\_Geographic Segmentation:** the campaign targets audiences based on a specific geographic location.

**T0072.002\_Demographic Segmentation:** the campaign targets audiences based on age, gender, income.

**T0072.005\_Political Segmentation:** the campaign targets audiences based on their political affiliations.

**T0081.007\_Identify Target Audience Adversaries:** the operator of the campaign is known to have made preliminary efforts to identify the online adversaries of the target audience on a platform. For example, pages dedicated to target audiences adversaries are created to identify them.

**T0003\_Leverage Existing Narratives:** the campaign is exploiting current narratives themes such as divisive social issues.

**T0004\_Develop Competing Narratives:** the campaign seeks to polarize the communities by creating narratives competing with the existing ones.

**T0022\_Leverage Conspiracy Theory Narratives:** the campaign is exploiting conspiracy theory narratives. This TTP can be used when there is no specific knowledge if the conspiracy theory is new or already existing in the debate.

**T0022.001\_Amplify Existing Conspiracy Theory Narratives:** the campaign is specifically amplifying existing conspiracy theory narratives, which support the campaign's objectives.

**T0068\_Respond to Breaking News Event or Active Crisis:** the campaign is exploiting the news or active crisis.

**T0082\_Develop New Narratives:** the campaign is developing new narratives that did not exist. This TTP can be used for example in the case of the development of the 'electoral fraud' narrative, which does not necessarily fall in the conspiracy theory narrative category.

**T0083\_Integrate Target Audience Vulnerabilities into Narrative:** the campaign's narratives appear to exploit domestic vulnerabilities such as domestic divisive issues and past colonial history.

**T0023\_Distort Facts:** the campaign's narratives are based on facts which are changed, twisted, or exaggerated.

**T0023.001\_Reframe Context:** the campaign's narratives distort the meaning of an event by removing its surrounding context – for instance, in a case of a war or of historical revisionism.

**T0084.001\_Use Copy Pasta:** the campaign uses the cospasta technique: a piece of text has been copied and pasted multiple times on the same or across various online platforms. The content may be slightly changed every time it is pasted to avoid detection by platforms.

**T0084.002\_Plagiarise Content:** the campaign uses content from other sources without proper attribution.

**T0084.003\_Deceptively Labelled or Translated:** the campaign adds deceptive labels or deceptively translate a content. For instance, an account impersonating a fact-checker can deceptively label an authentic fact-checking content as fake.

**T0084.004\_Appropriate Content:** the campaign uses content from other sources with proper attribution.

**T0085\_Develop Text-Based Content:** this TTP is used to cover the creation of text-based content not covered by the associated sub-techniques. For example, it can cover the development of candidates' speech, the development of tweets and short posting content.

**T0085.001\_Develop AI-Generated Text:** the campaign uses GenAI technology to develop text.

**T0085.003\_Develop Inauthentic News Article:** the campaign creates articles which are mimicking news articles but their content is often distorted, based on the mixing of different types of sources.

**T0085.004\_Develop Document:** the campaign creates inauthentic documents or modify existing ones, often obtain through hacking techniques.

**T0085.005\_Develop Book:** the campaign creates books, both e-books and physical books. For example, it was seen in the case of Taiwan 2024 Election.

**T0085.006\_Develop Opinion Article:** the campaign creates articles which are presented as opinions and are not necessarily inauthentic. They can be for example written by domestic legitimate actors which are unwittingly used to deliver authentic content supporting the campaign's narratives.

**T0086\_Develop Image-Based Content:** the campaign creates visual artifacts for different purposes related to the campaign, such as posting content or creating personas profiles pictures.

**T0086.001\_Develop Memes :** the campaign creates specifically memes.

**T0086.002\_Develop AI-Generated Images (Deepfakes):** the campaign uses GenAI technology to develop deepfake images. This TTP is particularly useful for describing GenAI profile pictures.

**T0086.004\_Aggregate Information Into Evidence Collages:** the campaign uses images from different sources to aggregate evidence.

**T0087\_Develop Video-Based Content:** the campaign creates video artifacts such as YouTube videos or documentaries supporting the campaign's narrative.

**T0087.001\_Develop AI-Generated Videos (Deepfakes):** the campaign uses GenAI technology to develop deepfake videos.

**T0087.002\_Deceptively Edit Videos (Cheapfakes):** the campaign alters images, video footage, or audio sounds to develop a video supporting the campaign's narrative. The edited nature of the video is most of the time obvious.

**T0088\_Develop Audio-Based Content:** the campaign creates audio artifacts such as a podcast.

**T0088.002\_Deceptively Edit Audio (Cheapfakes):** the campaign alters audio recordings to develop an audio artifact supporting the campaign's narrative. The edited nature of the audio is most of the time obvious.

**T0089\_Obtain Private Documents:** the campaign employs means (e.g. hacking, espionage) to obtain private documents from the targeted audience. This TTP can be used when it is unknown if these documents are authentic or have been altered.

**T0089.001\_Obtain Authentic Documents:** the campaign employs means (e.g. hacking, espionage) to obtain authentic documents from the targeted audience.

**T0089.003\_Alter Authentic Documents:** the campaign employs means (e.g. hacking, espionage) to obtain authentic documents from the targeted audience.

**T0007\_Create Inauthentic Social Media Pages and Groups:** the campaign creates social media pages and groups to convey the campaign's narratives.

**T0013\_Create Inauthentic Websites:** the campaign creates websites which are used for hosting content but not necessarily news content (see T0098).

**T0090\_Create Inauthentic Accounts:** the campaign creates inauthentic accounts to publish content or create pages and groups.

**T0090.004\_Create Sockpuppet Accounts:** the campaign uses inauthentic accounts who are promoting the influence campaign's narratives. It can be used when it is known that the trolls' accounts that are detected have been created by the campaign's operator. It is different from T0097 creating personas that actively impersonate domestic audiences.

**T0091.001\_Recruit Contractors:** the campaign uses paid contractors to support the campaign.

**T0091.002\_Recruit Partisans:** the campaign uses ideologically-aligned individuals to support the campaign.

**T0094\_Infiltrate Existing Networks:** the campaign inserts their social assets into existing networks of the targeted audiences.

**T0093\_Acquire/Recruit Network:** the campaign acquires an existing network by paying, recruiting, or exerting control over the leaders of an existing network. This TTP can be used when a troll network is repurposed from another campaign.

**T0093.001\_Fund Proxies:** the campaign funds entities to support the campaign. This TTP can be used to describe the funding of media organizations.

**T0092\_Build Network:** the campaign develops a network between social assets, both online and offline, both authentic and inauthentic. This TTP can be used when there is no particular description of how it is done or when the technique isn't listed in the sub-techniques.

**T0092.001\_Create organizations:** the campaign establishes organizations with authentic or inauthentic staff and structure to support the narratives of the campaign. Examples of organizations created include: The Foundation for Battling Injustice (FBI), Association for Free Research and International Cooperation (AFRIC).

**T0092.002\_Use Follow Trains:** this technique corresponds to a group of people following each other on a social media platform to grow inauthentically their social media following.

**T0092.003\_Create Community or Sub-Group:** the campaign establishes a community or sub-group when it doesn't exist to support the campaign's objectives.

**T0095\_Develop Owned Media Assets:** this TTP is used to describe the use of state affiliated media outlets and media outlets that are known to belong to a threat actor.

**T0096\_Leverage Content Farms:** the campaign uses content farms to support the propagation of the campaign's narratives. This TTP can be used when there is no particular description if the content farm has been created by the campaign or already exists.

**T0096.001\_Create Content Farms:** the campaign establishes a content farm to support the propagation of the campaign's narratives.

**T0096.002\_Outsource Content Creation to External Organizations:** the campaign outsources the content creation to a company or to a troll farm (e.g. US 2020 Elections: The IRA uses troll farms in Ghana, Nigeria and Mexico develop and post content to target specific U.S. audiences).

**T0141.001\_Acquire Compromise Accounts:** the campaign hacks or buys authentic user accounts.

**T0097\_Create Personas:** the campaign creates social assets posing as the targeted audiences.

**T0098.001\_Create Inauthentic News Sites:** the campaign creates websites which are posing as news sites.

**T0098.002\_Leverage Existing Inauthentic News Sites:** the campaign uses websites which are posing as news sites, but there is no evidence that they have been created by the campaign's operators.

**T0099\_Impersonate Existing Entities:** the campaign develops assets impersonating legitimate entities such as journalists, fact-checkers, investigators, political figures, or influencers.

**T0142\_Fabricate Grassroots Movement:** the campaign uses the astroturfing technique which is defined as creating a false impression of a widespread, spontaneously arising, grassroots movement.

**T0016\_Create Clickbait:** the campaign uses attention-grabbing headlines to drive traffic and engagement.

**T0018\_Purchase Targeted Advertisements:** the campaign creates or funds advertisements to target the audiences. This TTP is often followed by T0114 Deliver Ads.

**T0101\_Create Localised Content:** the campaign microtargets the audiences by creating content in local languages.

**T0029\_Online Polls:** the campaign uses online polls.

**T0043\_Chat Apps:** the campaign uses chat apps such as WhatsApp, Line, WeChat, Telegram, and Facebook messenger.

**T0103.001\_Video Livestream:** the campaign uses video livestream.

**T0104.001\_Mainstream Social Networks:** the campaign uses mainstream social networks such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, LinkedIn, and TikTok. The list can evolve depending on the development of a new platform that appeals to new generations.

**T0104.003\_Private/Closed Social Networks:** the campaign uses private/closed social networks such as Discord and Telegram. Telegram can be both a chat app and a private closed social network due to its dual functionalities.

**T0104.004\_Interest-Based Networks:** the campaign uses interest-based networks such as Alt-Right network: Gab, Parler, Gettr, Truth Social.

**T0105.002\_Video Sharing:** the campaign uses video sharing platforms such as YouTube, TikTok, Odysee and others.

**T0105.003\_Audio Sharing:** the campaign uses audio sharing platforms such as Spotify, Soundcloud, and others.

**T0106\_Discussion Forums:** the campaign uses discussion forums such as Reddit.

**T0106.001\_Anonymous Message Boards:** this TTP is used for the 'chans' as described in the DISARM Framework.

**T0107\_Bookmarking and Content Curation:** the campaign uses bookmarking and content curation platforms such as Pinterest. This TTP can be used for text sharing platforms such as Pastebin.

**T0108\_Blogging and Publishing Networks:** the campaign uses blogging and publishing platforms such as Medium, Substack, and others.

**T0110\_Formal Diplomatic Channels:** the campaign uses diplomats and embassies channels.

**T0111.001\_TV:** the campaign uses TV.

**T0111.002\_Newspaper:** the campaign uses newspapers.

**T0111.003\_Radio:** the campaign uses radio.

**T0112\_Email:** the campaign uses email to target the audiences.

**T0046\_Use Search Engine Optimization:** the campaign manipulates content engagement metrics to influence news search results on search engines.

**T0113\_Employ Commercial Analytic Firms:** the campaign uses commercial analytic firms to facilitate external data collection on the target audience.

**T0114\_Deliver Ads:** the campaign uses ads to deliver the narrative.

**T0115\_Post Content** the campaign posts content on platforms and websites to deliver the narrative.

**T0115.001\_Share Memes:** the campaign shares memes to deliver the narrative.

**T0116\_Comment or Reply on Content:** the campaign uses its assets to post comment or reply on content. The assets commenting are different from T0116.001.

**T0116.001\_Post Inauthentic Social Media Comments:** the campaign uses government-paid social media commenters, astroturfers, and/or chatbots to comment on online conversations, product reviews, website comment forums, and/or news website comment sections.

**T0117\_Attract Traditional Media:** the campaign uses traditional media to deliver the narrative.

**T0049\_Flood Information Space:** the campaign amplifies the narratives by flooding the information space. This TTP can be used when there is no particular description of how it is done or when the technique isn't listed in the subtechniques.

**T0049.003\_Bots Amplify via Automated Forwarding and Reposting:** the campaign amplifies the narratives via bots.

**T0049.002\_Flood Existing Hashtag:** the campaign exploits existing hashtags to give visibility to the campaign's narratives.

**T0049.001\_Trolls Amplify and Manipulate:** the campaign amplifies the narratives via trolls.

**T0039\_Bait Influencers:** domestic or international influencers, whether macro- or microinfluencers, are used to spread the narratives. They can be directly mentioned in tweets, invited in talk-shows

**T0119.001\_Post across Groups:** the campaign amplifies the narratives via groups cross-posting.

**T0119.002\_Post across Platforms:** the campaign amplifies the narratives via platforms cross-posting.

**T0122\_Direct Users to Alternative Platforms:** the campaign shares links directing users to platforms other than the one where the link was posted.

**T0048\_Harass:** the campaign uses intimidation techniques such as cyberbullying and doxing.

**T0048.002\_Harass People Based on Identities:** the campaign uses intimidation techniques such as cyberbullying and doxing based on the identity of the target audience (gender, sexuality, race, and others).

**T0123\_Control Information Environment through Offensive Cyberspace Operations:** the campaign uses cyber tools and techniques to control and alter the trajectory of content in the information space.

**T0124\_Suppress Opposition:** This TTP can be used when there is no particular description of how it is done or when the technique isn't listed in the subtechniques.

**T0124.003\_Exploit Platform TOS/Content Moderation:** the campaign suppresses the opposition by exploiting platform content moderation tools and processes like reporting non-violating content to platforms for takedown.

**T0057\_Organise Events:** the campaign organizes offline events.



**T0057.001\_Pay for Physical Action:** the campaign pays individuals to act in the physical realm.

**T0057.002\_Conduct Symbolic Action:** the campaign intends to signal something to the audience.

**T0126\_Encourage Attendance at Events:** the campaign encourages attendance at events.

**T0126.002\_Facilitate Logistics or Support for Attendance:** the campaign facilitates logistics or support for attendance at events. For example, it provides buses to organize convoys.

**T0061\_Sell Merchandise:** the campaign sells merchandise to promote the narratives of the campaign.

**Facebook:** the campaign's narratives and assets are spread on Facebook (T0104.001).

**Instagram:** the campaign's narratives and assets are spread on Instagram (T0104.001).

**X:** the campaign's narratives and assets are spread on Twitter (T0104.001).

**YouTube:** the campaign's narratives and assets are spread on YouTube (T0105.002).

**TikTok:** the campaign's narratives and assets are spread on TikTok (T0104.001 and T0105.002).

**Telegram:** the campaign's narratives and assets are spread on Telegram (T0043 and T0104.003).

**Gab:** the campaign's narratives and assets are spread on Gab (T0104.004).

**Parler:** the campaign's narratives and assets are spread on Parler (T0104.004).

**Gettr:** the campaign's narratives and assets are spread on Gettr (T0104.004).

**Truth Social:** the campaign's narratives and assets are spread on Truth Social (T0104.004).

**Vkontakte:** the campaign's narratives and assets are spread on VKontakte (T0104.001).

**Odnoklassniki:** the campaign's narratives and assets are spread on Odnoklassniki (T0104.001).

**Reddit:** the campaign's narratives and assets are spread on Reddit (T0106).

**4chan:** the campaign's narratives and assets are spread on 4chan (T0106.001).

**Discord:** the campaign's narratives and assets are spread on Discord (T0104.003).

**Tumblr:** the campaign's narratives and assets are spread on Tumblr (T0108).

**Pinterest:** the campaign's narratives and assets are spread on Pinterest (T0107).

**Paypal:** the campaign's narratives and assets are spread on Paypal (no TTP existing at this stage).

**LiveJournal:** the campaign's narratives and assets are spread on LiveJournal (T0108).

**Pastebin:** the campaign's narratives and assets are spread on Pastebin (T0107).

**Vimeo:** the campaign's narratives and assets are spread on Vimeo (T0105.002).

**WhatsApp:** the campaign's narratives and assets are spread on WhatsApp (T0043).

**WeChat:** the campaign's narratives and assets are spread on WeChat (T0043).

**Line:** the campaign's narratives and assets are spread on Line (T0043).

**Fiverr:** the campaign's narratives are spread on Fiverr (no TTP existing at this stage).

**OpenAI:** the campaign's narratives are spread on OpenAI. (no TTP exists at this stage).

**Cyber Attacks:** the event is also targeted by cyber attacks, related or not related to the campaign.

**Source 1:** indicates the open source document which mentions the TTPs and other contextual information about the event.

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